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ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT IN THE UNITED
STATES: MARKET STRUCTURE VERSUS
MARKET CONDUCT
MANLEY R. IRWIN*
WILLIAM H. BARRETT**
I. INTRODUCTION
A reassessment of antitrust policy in the United States may not ap-
pear particularly relevant in an economy beset by stubborn inflation
and a constitutional crisis. But the American economy is well into
the 1970's and structural patterns are now emerging that merit the
attention and consideration of public policy-makers. The economy is
experiencing a gradual shift from the production of goods to the pro-
vision of services.' The top 200 corporations find their positions in-
creasingly stabilized over time. 2 The multinational corporation has be-
come an institutional given.3 Regulated utilities are diversifying into
nonregulated activities.4 Horizontal and vertical mergers are once
again the dominant form of corporate expansion, after being temporar-
ily supplanted by the conglomerate binge of the 1960's.5 Amidst these
* Professor of Economics, Whittemore School of Business and Economics, Uni-
versity of New Hampshire; currently on leave with the Federal Communications Com-
mission trial staff. M.A., 1954, University of Michigan; Ph.D., 1963, Michigan State
University.
** Staff Economist, Federal Communications Commission trial staff. A.B., 1972,
University of New Hampshire.
The opinions expressed herein in no way reflect the policies of the Federal Commun-
ications Commission.
1. See D. BELL, THE COMING OF POST-INDuSTRIAL SOCIETY 108 (1973). See gen-
erally N. JACOBY, CORPORATE POWER AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY (1973).
2. This phenomenon is illustrated by examining the compilation of the 500 largest
American corporations, which appears annually in Fortune magazine, for the period
1963-1973.
3. See R. VERNON, SOVEREIGNTY AT BAY (1972); A Special Report-Multinational
Corporations in a Changing Environment, FORTUNE, Aug. 1973, at 52.
4. See Irwin & Stanley, Regulatory Circumvention and the Holding Company, 8
J. EcoN. ISSUES 395 (1974). See generally NATIONAL ASS'N OF REGULATORY UTILITY
COMMISSIONERS, REPORT OF THE AD Hoc COMMITTEE ON NON-UTILITY INVESTMENTS
(1972).
5. See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, CURRENT TRENDS IN MERGER ACTIvITY
(1971).
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changes it is appropriate to ask: Will the antitrust laws be effectively
enforced? Can they be enforced? Is the Sherman Act a declaration
of economic freedom or does the statute merely reflect the rhetoric
of a bygone era?
The answers to these questions depend, of course, on one's philo-
sophy of market competition and one's view of corporate behavior.
We will argue that public and private antitrust enforcement has se-
riously shortchanged the fundamental purpose of the American anti-
trust laws, namely, to protect, police, and, if necessary, rehabilitate
competitive market structures in the economy.7 First, we will review
the ,basic tenets of the two underlying "schools" of antitrust policy, the
structuralist and conduct/performance Schools. Secondly, we will
survey the records of both private and public antitrust enforcement
and review the advantages and disadvantages of each. Thirdly, we
will argue that an alternative to present antitrust enforcement respon-
sibilities and practices is necessary, and suggest that establishing a
Federal Industrial Reorganization Commission may be the only effec-
tive means to ensure that economic competition, diversity, and dyna-
mism prosper and prevail in the decades ahead. Such a solution is
currently before Congress in the proposed Industrial Reorganization
Act (Hart Bill)."
II. THE Two SCHOOLS OF ANTITRUST THOUGHT
Understanding the deficiencies of present antitrust enforcement re-
quires an appreciation of the respective policies advanced by the two
6. Ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970).
7. Northern Pac. R.R. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1957):
The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic
liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of
trade. It rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive
forces will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest
prices, the highest quality and the greatest material progress, while at the
same time providing an environment conducive to the preservation of our
democratic political and social institutions. But even were that premise open
to question, the policy unequivocally laid down by the Act is competition.
For discussion of the legislative intent of the Sherman Act, see W. Ln-wiN, LANv AND
ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA: THE EvoLTrrIoN OF THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST AcT
(1965); H. THORELLI, Tim FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: OR0GATION oF AN AMEm-
CAN TnADnmox (1955); Bork, Legislative History of the Sherman Act, 12 J.L. & ECON.
118 (1966).
8. S. 1167, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
[Vol. 1974:37
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss1/7
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
dominant schools of antitrust thought-the structuralist school and the
conduct/performance school.'
A. The Structuralist School
The structuralist school holds that the environment in which a firm
operates is the critical determinant of that firm's pricing, output, inno-
vation, and investment decisions. Structuralists assert that the factors
which constitute that environment-and thus the critical determinants
of market performance-are the number of firms in the industry, the
size of the firms, the difficulty or ease of market entry, and the dif-
ferentiation of the firm's products or services. Structuralists argue that
a firm in a competitive environment lacks discretionary control over
market prices and, therefore, is forced to operate at optimum cost and
efficiency by adjustments of its production and output. To the extent
that the pursuit of profit maximization produces optimum efficiency
and innovation, competition literally disciplines the firm to conduct it-
self in a socially desirable manner. The structuralist school asserts
that noncompetitive industry structure suborns anticompetitive market
conduct. An industry's structure determines that industry's economic
performance as well as its economic conduct.
The structuralist school emphasizes the "game" -the competitive
process-rather than the individual players. To the extent that a
dominant firm emerges in a market and the vitality of the competitive
process deteriorates, public policy must restructure or rehabilitate the
game. If the health of the game requires harsh therapy such as divesti-
ture or divorcement, such medicine is accepted as the means to serve
a higher end: economic efficiency and consumer satisfaction.
If the imperative of efficiency or economies of scale render the
game unworkable or inefficient, then competition is discarded as the
optimal means of stimulating and policing economic activity. But in
that event, some form of accountability must be imposed on the firm.
Usually that accountability takes the form of utility-type regulation."'
9. See generally J. BAIN, BARmRs TO NEW COMPETITION (1956); R. CAVES,
A~mECAN INDUSTRY: STRUCTURE, CONDUCT, AND PERFORMANCE (1964); A. PHILLIPS,
MARKET STRUCTURE, ORGANIZATION, AND PERFORMANCE: AN ESSAY ON PRICE FixiNG
AND COMBINATIONS IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE (1962); F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET
STRUCT RE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1970); Mason, The Current Status of the
Monopoly Problem in the United States, 62 HARv. L. REv. 1265 (1949); Mueller, The
New Antitrust: A "Structural" Approach, 1 ANTrIRuST L. & ECON. REV. 87 (1967).
10. See generally M. GLAEsER, PUBLIC UTILrrIEs IN AMERICAN CAPrrALISm
Vol. 1974:37]
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In the United States, the "natural monopoly" solution translates in-
to utility regulation. Such regulation, however, tends to be the excep-
tion rather than the rule. And even when public policy selects the
natural monopoly-public regulation solution, such government regula-
tion as a substitute for the competitive market should not or cannot
be ordered into perpetuity. One must not forget that a "natural"
monopoly today may well evolve into a competitive industry tomorrow.
B. The Conduct/Perfdrmance School
The conduct/performance school, by contrast, de-emphasizes the
size of the firms in an industry, their number, and their distribution.
In short, the conduct/performance school dismisses the significance
of firms' market power, either individually or collectively, to control
price or exclude competition. To proponents of the conduct/per-
formance school the acid test of the business enterprise is economic
behavior. It matters little if firms in a market are subsumed by iden-
tifiable categories of competition, oligopoly, or monopoly. The critical
standard is firm conduct, not market power. The conduct/perform-
ance school's guideline thus is, "By their fruits, ye shall know them."
The conduct/performance school dismisses the structuralists'
theory that market structure determines market performance and con-
duct. Rather, this school argues that each firm or industry must be
judged on its own merits. Conduct/performance proponents claim
that generalizations should be resisted. Indeed, competitive industries
may yield low progressivity and indifferent economic performance;
concentrated industries may yield excellent progressivity and un-
matched economic performance. To evaluate market behavior and
results, the conduct/performance school argues that each industry
must be studied and evaluated on an ad hoc basis.
Not surprisingly, antitrust policy is often caught in the ideological
debate between the structuralist and conduct/performance schools.
If the record of antitrust enforcement is any test, the conduct/per-
formance school has undoubtedly won, notwithstanding the tendency
of the conduct/performance school to dismiss a large body of eco-
nomic theory and documentation supporting the direct relationship be-
tween market performance and market configuration." In resisting
(1957); D. PEGRUM, PUBLIC REGULATION OF BusINEss (1965); C. WILCOX, PUBLIC
POLICmS TOWARD BusmIEss (1955).
11. See, e.g., W. ADAMS, Tim STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN ImDUsTRY (4th ed. 1971);
[V/ol. 1974:37
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this body of received doctrine, the conduct/performance school
essentially posits a "yes-but" approach: Yes, competition may be de-
sirable, but note the exceptions--exceptions that define away the sig-
nificance of market structure. A search of the literature dealing with
the synthetic fiber, chemical, aircraft, and drug industries, for example,
finds conclusions claiming these industries to be exceptions to the
structuralists' theory that market structure governs market conduct and
performance.'12
The conduct/performance apologists inevitably counsel, "Don't
make waves," do not indulge in structural reform. In an imperfect
economic world, respectable, second-best performance is not all thaf
bad. In some ways the conduct/performance approach is reminiscent
of Santayana's chicks, who peck at "indigestible" pebbles rejected by
their parents. 13
The conduct/performance school is also afflicted by problems of
circularity. To measure efficiency or market innovation, for example,
students of economic policy are counselled to examine historical and
empirical data. But that exercise is not without its frustrations. How
can one render an assessment of such factors as profits, prices, cost,
J. BAINJ, supra note 9; J. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATiON (1959); J. BAIN, THE Eco-
NOMICS OF THE PACIFIC COAST PETROLEUM INDUSTRY (1945); J. BLAIR, ECONOMIC
CONCENTRATION: STRUCTURE, BEHAVIOR AND PUBLIC POLICY (1972); J. JEWKES, D.
SAWERS & R. STILLERMAN, THE SOURCES OF INVENTION (1958); E. MANSFIELD, THE
ECONOMICS OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE (1968); W. MUELLER, A PRIMER ON MONOP-
OLY AND COMPETITION (1970); J. SCHMOOKLER, INVENTION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
(1966); W. SHEPHERD, MARKET POWER AND ECONOMIC WELFARE (1970); H. WALKER,
MARKET POWER AND PRICE LEVELS IN THE ETHICAL DRUG INDUSTRY (1971); L. WEISS,
ECONOMICS AND AMERICAN INDUSTRY (1961); Hearings on Economic Concentration
Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the ludici-
ary, 89th-91st Congs., pts. 1-8A (1964-1970); Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Anti-
trust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th-86th Congs., pts. 1-
10 (1957-1960).
12. See J. BACKMAN, CHEMICAL PRICES, PRODUCTIVITY, WAGES, AND PROFITS
(1964); J. MARKHAM, COMPETITION IN THE RAYON INDUSTRY (1952); A. PHILLI'S,
TECHNOLOGY AND MARKET STRUCTURE: A STUDY OF THE AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY (1971);
Hearings on Competitive Problems in the Drug Industry Before the Senate Select
Comm. on Small Business, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 5 (1967).
13. G. SANTAYANA, Tipperary, in SOLILOQUIES IN ENGLAND 99, 101 (1922):
As it is, we live experimentally, moodily, in the dark; each generation breaks
its egg-shell with the same haste and assurance as the last, pecks at the same
indigestible pebbles, dreams the same dreams, or others just as absurd, and
if it hears anything of what former men have learned by experience, it cor-
rects their maxims by its first impressions, and rushes down any untrodden
path which it finds alluring, to die in its own way, or become wise too late
and to no purpose.
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investment, and innovation in the absence of outside benchmarks? In-
variably the conduct/performance school is driven back to the
premise it initially rejects, namely, an examination of alternative struc-
tures, alternative firms, and alternative performances: in short, compe-
tition.
Finally, the conduct/performance school, for whatever reason,
tends to ignore the evidence of industry studies compiled over time-
studies that over and over again establish the strong relationship be-
tween market performance and market structure. 14 The conduct/
performance school appears intent to redefine, re-examine, and redis-
cover old verities, as if somehow to prove that corporate planning and
control should preempt the impersonal mechanism of the market
place; that at heart, most corporations' incentives approximate the al-
truism of the United Fund and are blessed with the benign creativity
of Leonardo da Vinci.
It should be clear that we find the conduct/performance school
of antitrust evasive and unpersuasive. We submit that market struc-
ture is the key variable in understanding the conduct of a business
firm and in assessing its price, output, and investment decisions. We
are persuaded that a "standard that would have the antitrust authori-
ties and the courts assign greater weight to a defendant's 'efficiency'
and 'progressiveness' than to an inordinately large share of a highly
concentrated, entry-barricaded market is in reality no standard at all;
it is simply a vote of 'no confidence' in a competitive economic sys-
tem."'.5 With this structural frame of reference we examine American
antitrust policy as enforced by the Department of Justice and private
litigants.
III. PUBLIC ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
The Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust Division of the
Department of Justice are charged with the responsibility of enforcing
the federal antitrust laws: the Sherman, Clayton,' Federal Trade
Commission,17 and Robinson-Patman 8 Acts. Section 2 of the Sher-
14. See note 11 supra.
15. Mueller, supra note 9, at 105.
16. Ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27, 44 (1970).
17. Ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-51 (1970).
18. Ch. 592, §§ 1-4, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b, 21a
(1970).
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man Act 9 prohibits monopolization and attempts to monopolize; its
enforcement is entrusted both to the Justice Department and to pri-
vate parties. Section 2 is the fundamental weapon in the federal anti-
trust arsenal to dissolve and reorganize offensive, anticompetitive con-
centrations of market power. Public antitrust suits are, of course, a
double-edged sword, featuring both advantages and disadvantages.2 0
A. Advantages
An important advantage of Justice Department antitrust suits is that
the Antitrust Division has the public standing and responsibility to pro-
secute and to reform markets victimized by disproportionately large
concentrations of economic power. If successfully prosecuted, offend-
ing firms may be forced to divest former acquisitions"' or may be de-
clared monopolies on the basis of their existing market share.22  The
structural remedies proposed by the Antitrust Division are those of a
public agency which presumably intends to rehabilitate formerly anti-
competitively structured markets so that the resulting benefits redound
to the advantage of the general public, not simply to particular competi-
tors.23 Courts have been willing to differentiate between the posses-
sion of market power by a firm or group of firms acting collectively
19. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970) provides:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished
by fine not exceeding fifty thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceed-
ing one year, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
20. Although § 7 of the Clayton Act is also an effective weapon to enjoin prospec-
tive mergers producing increased market concentration as well as to force divestiture
of consummated mergers which can be shown to have "substantially lessened" compe-
tition, it is the Justice Department's antitrust record which deserves emphasis because
of its exclusive § 2 powers within the federal government. Aside from § 7 and
the FTC's exclusive authority under § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (the
latter which has been long neglected as a structural antitrust weapon), and, of course,
§ 2 of the Sherman Act, the balance of the federal antitrust statutes are directed to
the prosecution of anticompetitive conduct ruled violative by the courts and of business
practices explicitly proscribed by the statutes themselves.
21. United States v. DuPont & Co., 366 U.S. 316 (1961). See also Ford Motor
Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562 (1972).
22. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 44 F. Supp. 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1941),
alf'd in part and rev'd in part, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
23. See Breit & Elzinga, Antitrust Penalties and Attitudes Toward Risk: An Eco-
nomic Analysis, 86 HARv. L. Rnv. 693 (1973).
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and the exercise of that market power.24 That distinction was explicit
in the Supreme Court's decision in the 1946 case, American Tobacco
Co. v. United States:25
[T]he material consideration in determining whether a monopoly exists
is not that prices are raised and that competition actually is excluded but
that power exists to raise prices or to exclude competition when it is
desired to do so . . . . "It is undoubtedly true ... that trade and
commerce are 'monopolized' within the meaning of the federal statute,
when, as a result of efforts to that end, such power is obtained that a
few persons acting together can control the prices of a commodity mov-
24. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966):
The offense of monopoly under § 2 of the Sherman Act has two elements:
(1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the
willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth
or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or
historical accident. . . . In United States v. du Pont & Co. [351 U.S. 377,
391 (1965)] we defined monopoly power as "the power to control prices or
exclude competition." The existence of such power ordinarily may be in-
ferred from the predominant share of the market.
The district court in Grinnell had observed:
2. To succeed in a Section 2 case plaintiff must prove that the putative
monopolist or monopolists sought to achieve or achieved the economic power,
even though unexercised, to control prices or production in a relevant market,
or to exclude competition therefrom. Proof may be direct or indirect.
3. One indirect method to prove the requisite power is to show defendants'
occupancy of an overwhelming (but not mathematically definable) percentage
of the market, unless that position, - or, as it is called, "share of the mar-
ket", - is shown by the supposed monopolist to be attributable exclusively
to his skill, efficiency, foresight, or like affirmatively laudable business con-
duct. Unless he maintains the burden of proving himself within the excep-
tion, the occupant in the dominant position stands condemned.
United States v. Grinnell Corp., 236 F. Supp. 244, 257 (D.R.I. 1964), aird, 384 U.S.
563 (1966). In United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 106-07 (1948) (footnotes
omitted), the Court said:
For those things which are condemned by § 2 are in large measure merely
the end products of conduct which violates § 1.... But that is not always
true. Section 1 covers contracts, combinations, or conspiracies in restraint of
trade. Section 2 is not restricted to conspiracies or combinations to monopo-
lize but also makes it a crime for any person to monopolize any part of
interstate or foreign trade or commerce. So it is that monopoly power,
whether lawfully or unlawfully acquired, may itself constitute an evil and
stand condemned under § 2 even though it remains unexercised. For § 2 of
the Act is aimed, inter alia, at the acquisition or retention of effective market
control.
See also United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 428-29 (2d Cir.
1945); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 342-43 (D.
Mass.), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1953); Hale & Hale, Market Power: Size and
Shops Under the Sherman Act, 43 ILL. L. Rav. 745 (1949).
25. 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
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ing in interstate commerce. It is not necessary that the power thus
obtained should be exercised. Its existence is sufficient." 26
A second virtue of the public suit is that presumably the Department
of Justice possesses the resources necessary to prosecute monopoly
power and market control. If the Department's personnel believe that
its resources are inadequate to discharge the Antitrust Division's re-
sponsibilities, they can present their request for additional resources
to Congress.27 To our knowledge no Assistant Attorney General in
charge of antitrust has resigned because of lack of funding for the
Antitrust Division. Perhaps the real problem is the setting of priori-
ties and the effective allocation of funds within the Antitrust Divi-
sion.28
A third advantage of public suits is the Department of Justice's
antitrust win/loss record. That record is indeed enviable. Since
1910, there has not been a five-year period in which the Department
26. Id. at 811, quoting United States v. Patten, 187 F. 664, 672 (S.D.N.Y. 1911),
rev'd on other grounds, 226 U.S. 525 (1913). See also THE CLOSED ENTERPRISE SYS-
TEM: THE NADER STUDY GROUP REPORT ON ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 296-301 (M.
Green ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as NADER REPORT]; C. KAYSEN & D. TUNER, AN-
TITRUST POLICY: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 20-21 (1959); Rostow, The New
Sherman Act: A Positive Instrument of Progress, 14 U. CHI. L. REv. 567 (1947).
27, NADER REPORT 129-30. See also W. SEYMOUR, WHY JUSTICE FAILs 187-89
(1973); Baker, Section 2 Enforcement-View From the Trench, 41 ABA ANTrrrusT
L.J. 613 (1972); Shepard, The Economics: A Pep Talk, 41 ABA ANTITRUST LJ. 595
(1972).
28. See Shepard, supra note 27, at 598.
The Antitrust Division has occasionally allocated some resources to attempt to re-
structure some of the most offensively structured industries, only to retreat from the
necessary litigation. For example, in hearings in February 1974 before the Senate Sub-
committee on Antitrust and Monopoly it was disclosed that the staff of the Antitrust
Division had prepared a suit at the direction of the Assistant Attorney General in
charge of antitrust, Donald F. Turner, to restructure the automobile industry. Although
the complaint was prepared by 1966, the staff attorney responsible charged that
"Turner never made a recommendation to [Attorney General] Clark and, in fact, 'to-
tally refused to address himself' to the issue" of automobile industry structural reform.
However, "Eight weeks after resigning, Turner urged his successor . . . to file a civil
suit" attacking the shared monopoly of General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler. Mintz,
Big 3 Suit Eyed in 1966: U.S. Auto Antitrust Inaction Disclosed, Washington Post,
Mar. 1, 1974, § A, at 2.
Another example is the Antitrust Division's attack on the American Telephone and
Telegraph Company's manufacturing monopoly, Western Electric. Although the Justice
Department filed a § 2 suit in 1949 seeking divestiture of Western Electric from AT&T,
the suit was settled by an anemic consent decree in 1956 which left the structure of
the telecommunications equipment industry intact and dominated by AT&T's subsidiary,
Western Electric.
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failed to prevail in over one-half of the cases it prosecuted. 2  Be-
tween 1960 and 1964, for example, and again between 1965 and
1969, the Department won 85% and 96% of its cases, respectively. 0
It must be added that jiossibly that record is a result of judiciously
prosecuting only those suits in which -the Department believed the
probability of success outweighed that of failure. If that is the case,
the statistics may not be as telling as they appear at first reading. But
it is noteworthy that Justice Stewart observed in his dissent in United
States v. Von's Grocery Co.3' that when Antitrust Division cases are
decided by the Supreme Court, the Justice Department "always wins."
B. Disadvantages
On the other hand, Government antitrust suits are not without their
disadvantages. First, the number of Justice Department suits prose-
cuting monopoly and excessive market power has declined while the
number of suits prosecuting anticompetitive conduct has increased.
Between 1890 and 1969, the Antitrust Division filed a total of 1551
antitrust actions. As shown by Table I, 370 of these 1551 cases in-
volved charges of monopolization:
TABLE 13F2
CLASSIFICATION OF JUSTICE DEPARTMENT ANTITRUST
ACTIONS AND TYPES OF RELIEF OBTAINED
1890- 1940- 1945- 1950- 1955- 1960- 1965-
1969 1944 1949 1954 1959 1964 1969
1. Total Charges Filed 1551 223 157 159 195 215 195
a. horizontal conspiracy 989 179 114 122 122 104 75
b. monopolization 370 65 60 62 45 40 11
2. Total Number of Cases
in Which Significant
Divestiture or Dissolution
Was Carried Out 32 1 7 5 0 2 0
a. national or large
regional monopolist 24 1 6 3 0 2 0
b. local or small regional
monopolist 8 0 1 2 0 0 0
29. Posner, A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J.L. & ECON. 365, 381
(1970) (Table 2) [hereinafter cited as Posner].
30. Id.
31. 384 U.S. 270, 301 (1966).
32. Data are from Table 23, "Topical Classification of Department of Justice Anti-
trust Charges," and Table 29, 'The Use of Dissolution or Divestiture Decrees in De-
partment of Justice Monopolization Cases," Posner 398, 406.
[Vol. 1974:37
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Since 1940 the incidence of monopoly suits has decreased, notwith-
standing the persistence of market concentration in many American
industries.3 3
In contrast to the 370 antimonopoly cases filed between 1890 and
1969, the Antitrust Division filed 989 horizontal conspiracy cases, 240
cases involving illegal boycotts, 194 cases challenging acquisitions, 140
cases charging exclusive dealing, 123 cases involving price discrimina-
tion, and 165 cases involving new patents and copyrights.3 4  As con-
firmed by these statistics, the emphasis on prosecuting anticompetitive
conduct clearly outweighed prosecuting anticompetitive structure.
The conduct/performance school clearly triumphed over the struc-
turalist school. 5
A second problem is that even when the Government prevails in
an antimonopoly suit, the structural remedies prescribed by the courts
are often misconceived or inadequate."' In only 32 of the 370 mo-
nopolization cases prosecuted between 1890 and 1969 was any signifi-
cant remedy of divestiture or dissolution ordered.37 Stated differently,
only about two percent of the Antitrust Division's total antitrust
cases brought between 1890 and 1969 achieved the goal of significant
restructuring of the particular industry under indictment.3 8
33. UNITED STATES BuREAu OF THE C-isus, Value-of-Shipment Concentration
Ratios By Industry, in ANNUAL SuRVEY OF MANUFAcTURERS, 1966, at 8 (1968);
UNITED STATES SENATE, CONCENTRATION RATIOS IN MANUFACTURING INDusTRY: 1963
(1963).
34. Posner 398 (Table 23). The FTC's structural antitrust enforcement record is
even more disheartening. From 1915 to 1969 the FTC filed a total of 1305 antitrust
actions, only 60 of which charged monopolization and only 31 of which were filed after
1941. Id. at 408 (Table 31).
35. See Brodner, Monopolization and Attempts to Monopolize: Whatever Happened
to Section 2?, 41 ABA ANTITRUSr L.J. 589, 591 (1972); Cox, Competition and Section
2 of the Sherman Act, 27 ABA ArTITRusT L.J. 72, 76 (1965); Fortas, Part II: Portents
for New Antitrust Policy, 10 ANTrIRusT BULL. 41 (1965).
36. After studying the American Tobacco and Alcoa decisions, Walter Adams con-
cluded that the "[Justice Department] has not been able to secure the kind of remedy
which would dissipate the effects of monopoly and encourage the restoration of a more
competitive industrial structure; . . . the Government, therefore, has won many a law
suit but lost many a cause." Adams, Dissolution, Divorcement, Divestiture: The
Pyrrhic Victories, 27 IND. L.J. 1, 31 (1951). See also Elzinga, The Antimerger Law:
Pyrrhic Victories?, 12 J.L. & EcoN. 43 (1969); Pfunder, Plaine & Whittemore, Com-
pliance with Divestiture Orders Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act: An Analysis of
the Relief Obtained, 17 ANTITRUST BULL. 19, 134-35 (1972); Rostow, supra note 26, at
589.
37. Posner 405 (Table 28).
38. Kaysen and Turner recommended in 1959 that Congress establish a special
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A third problem inherent in the Antitrust Division's enforcement
experience is its penchant for consent decrees. True, consent decrees
often expedite the resolution of cases which might require protracted
litigation. But the advantage of releasing resources for the prosecu-
tion of other cases pales beside the fact that consent decrees are often
negotiated in private between the Antitrust Division and the defend-
ants,' 9 often complicating treble damage recovery 'by other parties in-
jured by the defendants' anticompetitive actions in the market.40 The
Economics Court to hear all § 2 cases as well as all others in which divestiture or
dissolution relief was sought. C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, supra note 26, at 252, 268-
69. However, for a contrasting opinion asserting that the federal district courts are
an adequate and effective forum for resolving divestiture and dissolution issues, see
Celler, The Trial Court's Competence to Pass Upon Divestiture Relief, 10 ANT1TRUST
BULL. 693 (1965).
Finally appreciating the direct relationship between structure and conduct, the Justice
Department now is seriously considering reforming its policy concerning antitrust rem-
edies. Assistant Attorney General Thomas Kauper said recently:
[iThe traditional forms of relief requested and secured in Government civil
cases attacking agreements among competitors under section 1 . . . is conduct-
oriented, and the injunction provisions seek to dissolve whatever arrangements
the defendants have made to effectuate their agreements and to prevent repeti-
tion of the challenged practices. I am becoming convinced that this may be
too narrow a view of effective civil relief in such cases, and that we must
explore the relation between illegal conduct of firms in an industry and that
industry's structure. Certainly in a concentrated industry where the same
types of illegal agreements among competing firms have been discovered and
prosecuted more than once, it seems appropriate to me to examine carefully
whether the industry structure necessarily contributes in some way to the re-
cidivism of the firms in the industry. If that question can be convincingly
answered in the affirmative, then structural relief-including divestiture-may
be appropriate.
Address by Thomas E. Kauper before the Practicing Law Institute, in Washington,
D.C., Dec. 7, 1973.
39. Note, The ITI'T Dividend: Reform of Department of Justice Consent Decree
Procedures, 73 CoLuM. L. REv. 594, 595-602 (1973).
Thurman Arnold disapproved of the rationalization that consent decrees are in the
public interest because they maximize the Justice Department's scarce resources: "It
is an appealing theory, but my experience since I came in the Antitrust Division leads
me to believe that consent decrees are irresponsible regulation of business which in
9 cases out of 10 will put a semi-government approval upon a way of doing business
which is actually antithetic to the antitrust laws." Hearings on the Role of Private
Antitrust Enforcement in Protecting Small Business Before a Subcomm. of the Senate
Select Comm. on Small Business, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 165 (1958).
40. It is important to note that if a consent decree is consummated prior to the
taking of any evidence, private parties seeking treble damages and charging violations
identical to those in the Justice Department's suit are precluded by § 5 of the Clayton
Act from using the consent decree as prima facie evidence. See Hearings on Nolo
Contendere and Private Antitrust Enforcement Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and
Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966). See
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consent decree has certainly dominated the resolution of cases filed by
the Antitrust Division. Between 1890 and 1969, 76% of all Antitrust
Division cases were settled by consent decree.4 For the period 1960
to 1964, and again from 1965 to 1969, 81% and 90% of 'the Divisions
cases respectively were settled by consent decree.42
A fourth problem arises from the role of the courts in public en-
forcement of antitrust. In many ways the courts have engaged in judi-
cial legislation when applying the Sherman Act in Justice Department
cases. The "rule of reason"43 has left a legacy of judicial preoccu-
pation with corporate conduct rather than with market power, with
corporate performance rather than with disproportionate corporate
size." ' Even in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America45 the court
was unwilling to break Alcoa into several competing firms. The
courts have often confused the public interest with the defendants' pri-
vate interest;4 6 in doing so they render meaningless the thrust and in-
tent of the Sherman Act.
The real indictment of public antitrust enforcement is its failure to
address and resolve successfully the problems of disproportionate firm
size in markets dominated by one or several giant firms. That anti-
trust effectiveness can be and has been thwarted by tax laws, subsidy
grants, and congressional immunization from foreign competition is all
too apparent .4  But one waits patiently for the Antitrust Division to
apply its resources to the persistence of market power in the steel, auto-
also S. GOLDBERG, THE CONSENT DECREE: ITS FORMATION AND USE (1962); E. TIM-
BERLAKE, FEDERAL TREBLE DAMAGE ANTITRUST ACTIONS 246-74 (1965).
41. Posner 375 (Table 5).
42. Id.
43. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); see W. I.TWiN, supra
note 7; 3. Twiss, LAWYERS AND THE CONSTITUTION: How LAIssEZ FAIRE CAME To
THE SUPREME COURT (1942); Corwin, The Antitrust Acts and the Constitution, 18 VA.
L. REv. 355 (1932); Dishman, Mr. Justice White and the Rule of Reason, 13 REv.
POLITICS 229 (1951); M. HANDLER, The Judicial Architects of the Rule of Reason, in
ANTITRUST IN PERSPECTIVE: THE COMPLEMENTARY ROLES OF RULE AND DISCRETION
123 (1957).
44. See A. KAHN & J. DIRLAM, FAIR COMPETITION: THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF
ANTITRUST POLICY (1954); A. NEALE, THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA (1960). See also Brodner, supra note 35; Cox, supra note 35; Fortas,
supra note 35; Rostow, supra note 26.
45. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
46. See Adams, supra note 36; Rostow, supra note 26.
47. See Gray, Supplemental Action to Reinforce Antitrust, in Administered Prices:
A Compendium on Public Policy, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Mo-
nopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 140 (1963).
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mobile, and telecommunications equipment industries, to name a
few. 48  The Antitrust Division must do more than exist in order to
prove its vitality and necessity. Its promises must be translated into
action. Little wonder economist John Kenneth Galbraith, viewing the
Justice Department's antitrust enforcement record, dismissed antitrust
enforcement as an anachronistic charade.49
IV. PRIVATE ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
If public antitrust enforcement has been emasculated by the con-
duct/performance philosophy, has the private antitrust litigant com-
pensated for this lack of structural enforcement? The Sherman Act
has always provided an incentive for private enforcement by permit-
ting private parties to seek -treble damages for anticompetitive injuries
caused by defendants. That incentive is now embraced 'by section
4 of the Clayton Act. The treble damage suit has been regarded as
an ingenious device to promote private enforcement of -the antitrust
laws.50 Like the public suit, the private suit offers both virtues and
infirmities.
A. Advantages
Neither the volume nor thrust of private antitrust litigation is gov-
erned solely by the Justice Department's antitrust budget or enforce-
ment policies. Private antitrust litigants have recently become much
more active than ever before."1 Table II shows the increase in private
cases filed between 1967 and 1971:
48. NADER REPORT 293-308.
49. J. GA B.uArr, TBE NEW INDUsTRLAL STATE 197 (1967).
50. Loevinger, Private Action-The Strongest Pillar of Antitrust, 3 ANTIrRUST
BULL. 167 (1958).
John Scott, a Washington, D.C. antitrust lawyer, claims that "this is the golden age
of the antitrust bounty hunter. Today the private plaintiff packs a harder wallop than
either the Justice Department or the Federal Trade Commission." Jerrold C. Van
Cise, a prominent antitrust attorney in New York City, states that "the private [anti-
trust] plaintiff seems destined to play an even more prominent role in the future [of
antitrust enforcement]." Wall Street J., Jan. 18, 1972, at 1. See also Wall Street J.,
June 22, 1966, at 32; Wall Street J., Nov. 29, 1973, at 1; BusiNEss WEEK, May 12,
1973, at 120; BusnqEsS WEEK, Aug. 12, 1972, at 51-54; FoRans, Oct. 1, 1973, at 53.
51. Carruth, The Legal Explosion Has Left Business Shell-Shocked, FORTUNE, Apr.
1973, at 69.
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TABLE 1152
THE RECENT INCREASE IN PRIVATE ANTITRUST LITIGATION
Year Number of Private Cases Filed
1967 543
1968 659
1969 740
1970 877
1971 1445
The 877 suits filed in 1970 represent an increase of 334 over the num-
ber filed in 1967. The increase from 877 to 1445 between 1970 and
1971 was even more dramatic. This increase has prompted some ob-
servers to argue that the private suit is, in fact, enforcing the antitrust
laws.53
Certainly the private suit performs an important role in supplement-
ing public antitrust enforcement efforts, enabling the Government to
narrow and concentrate its resources on crucial cases. John W.
Gwynne, former Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission, stated
that private suits unburdened an already stretched Commission staff
by "saving money for the Department [which] enables the Federal
Trade Commission to concentrate on hard core cases to the greatest
possible public benefit."'"
A third advantage of the private suit is that it is just that, private.
Private plaintiffs are likely to possess considerable expertise in their
particular trade or commerce. 55 They know how the market game
is played, they suffer the consequences of offensive market power, and
52. Data are from Collen, Procedural Directions in Antitrust Treble Damage Liti-
gation: An Overview of Changing Judicial Attitudes, 17 ANTTRusT BULL. 997, 1000
(1972).
53. See note 50 supra.
54. J. GWYNNE, THE ROLE OF PrvATm ANTrUST ENFORCEMENT IN PRoTEcTING
SMALL BuslNFss 1175 (1958). See also id. at 141 (statement of Victor Hanson, As-
sistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division, Department of Justice);
Bicks, The Department of Justice and Private Treble Damage Actions, 4 ANurrRusT
BULL. 5 (1959).
55. The private plaintiff's intimacy with a particular industry probably accounts for
the significant role of the private litigant in prosecuting anticompetitive patent prac-
tices. A 1952 Note in the Yale Law Journal assessing the impact of private antitrust
litigation concluded that "[ilts most striking solo accomplishment has probably been
in patent cases, where private suits have continued the government trend toward re-
stricting the scope of the patentee's monopoly." Note, Antitrust Enforcement By Pri-
vate Parties: Analysis of Developments in the Treble Damage Suit, 61 YALE L.J. 1010,
1061 (1952).
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they know the questions to ask. The Control Data/IBM suit" is a
case in point. Control Data, in its Sherman Act sections 1 and 2 suit
against IBM, assembled a computerized data and document index
deemed so valuable that IBM, as part of its settlement with Control
Data, bargained for the index' destruction. 57 In contrast, the Govern-
ment's section 2 suit against IBM, filed not long after Control Data's,
has not been noted for its expedient prosecution. The difference may
be explained in Control Data's lower start-up costs in comprehending
the complexities of the computer industry.58
B. Disadvantages
Private antitrust suits are not without their problems, however. Pri-
vate litigants tend to prosecute anticompetitive conduct, seeking treble
damages attributable to -the defendants' allegedly anticompetitive be-
havior. But note the emphasis on conduct. To the extent that private
suits emphasize corporate market behavior, such suits prosecute anti-
competitive symptoms rather than causes. Professor Posner's study of
antitrust enforcement notes that private litigants primarily file suits
attacking price fixing and other anticompetitive practices rather than
monopoly and excessive market power itself:
TABLE 11 59
CLASSIFICATION OF PRIVATE ANTITRUST SUITS
Number of Cases Reported
Type of Suit 1965-1969
1. monopolization 52
2. price fixing 132
3. exclusive dealing 36
4. tying contracts 28
5. price discrimination 92
6. other vertical restraints 33
7. acquisitions 27
8. boycotts 74
Total 474
56. Control Data Corp. v. IBM, Civ. No. 3068-32 (D. Minn. 1968).
57. Gardner, IBM-CDC Settlement Cripples Justice Discovery Mechanism, 19
DATAmATION 98 (Feb. 1973).
58. Id.
59. Posner 409 (Table 32).
Guilfoil's study of private antitrust enforcement between 1940 and 1963 determined
that price fixing accounted for 50% of the private cases reported; refusals to deal-
.9%; monopolization-l1%; price discrimination-6%; patent msuse-5%; and ex-
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Secondly, the private litigant's record of success is anything but re-
assuring, despite the increasing number of private antitrust suits. Of
the 157 private cases reported between 1890 and 1949, for example,
private plaintiffs recovered in only 14 of such suits, prompting one
observer to note: "If monopoly formed the crux of the plaintiff's com-
plaint, he stood practically no chance of court recovery, plaintiff losses
outnumbering victories by 42 to 1."10  The record between 1940 and
1963 reflects little increase in plaintiffs' success. During that 23-year
period plaintiffs won one monopolization suit for every 39 tried in the
courts. Suffice it to note that as private plaintiffs' suits have increased
in number, their success rate has not increased proportionately. 1
A third disadvantage attending the private suit is that few plaintiffs
possess the financial resources to engage in expensive heroics attacking
entrenched and wealthy dominant firms in concentrated industries. 6"
Nor should the public expect private plaintiffs to do so. Sometimes
the plaintiff's suit makes the point to the defendant when the case
is filed;63 the defendant, rather than risk time, expense, and bad pub-
licity, agrees to an out-of-court settlement.6 4  And the gap between
clusive dealing and tying contracts-2%. Guilfoil, Private Enforcement of U.S. Anti-
trust Law, 10 ANTITRUST BULL. 747 (1965).
60. Guilfoil, supra note 59, at 750.
61. Id. The private plaintiff's victory rates for charges other than monopoly were
substantially better: exclusive dealing and tying contracts-5.3 to 1; price fixing-4.6
to I; refusals to deal-3.3. to 1; patent misuse-3.1 to 1. Id.
Some commentators have observed that private antitrust suits are also an ineffective
means of antitrust enforcement because victorious plaintiffs are not often awarded the
damages to which they are entitled. E.g., Parker, Treble Damage Action-A Financial
Deterrent to Antitiust Violations?, 16 ANTITRUST BULL. 483, 505 (1971). See also
Breit & Elzinga, supra note 23; Parker, The Deterrent Effect of Private Treble Damage
Suits: Fact or Fantasy?, 3 NEw MEX. L. REv. 286 (1973).
62. Private plaintiffs' antitrust attorney Harold Kohn states that not only is anti-
trust litigation the most expensive type of suit, but there is no way to advise a potential
plaintiff how expensive the suit may be. Kohn, Evaluation of an Antitrust Claim, Pro-
spective Cost of Litigation, Standing to Sue and Preparation of Suit, 38 ABA ANTI-
TRUST L.J. 7, 10 (1969). See also Alioto, The Economics of a Treble Damage Case,
35 ABA ANTITRUST L.J. 87, 92 (1966); Blecher, The Plaintiffs Viewpoint, 38 ABA
ANTITRUST L.J. 55 (1969); Loevinger, supra note 50, at 169-70.
It is claimed that IBM maintained a legion of from forty to fifty lawyers in Okla-
homa City devoted entirely to supporting IBM's trial staff in litigating Telex' anticom-
pet,tive conduct charges against IBM.
63. E. TIMBERLACE, supra note 40, at 13.
64. For example, Sanders Associates, a manufacturer of computer display termi-
nals, threatened IBM with antitrust action when IBM introduced its new 370 computer.
IBM advised its potential customers already using Sanders terminals that the 370 re-
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settlement and actual damages obviously works to the advantage of
the defendant. 5
The Control Data/IBM settlement suggests that the aggrieved plain-
tiff is more interested in its income statement than some fine point
of economics or antitrust law. Much to the anguish of the Department
of Justice, the litigants negotiated a cash settlement, an exchange of
some IBM assets, and the destruction of Control Data's computerized
litigation index. In other cases, the settlement is more discreet;
awarding subcontracts to plaintiffs has nipped at least one private case
in the bud.66 Whatever constitutes settlement seduction, the fact re-
mains that many litigants reach their own private "consent decrees,"
satisfying their limited private interests. Yet the public interest often
deserves adjudication of the charges at issue.67
quired software which could accommodate only IBM terminals. According to Sanders'
counsel, "IBM was very reasonable .... They said, 'Let's face it. We've got enough
lawsuits."' Wall Street I., Jan. 8, 1974, at 11.
Forbes claims that the "majority" of private antitrust suits are settled out of court.
FoBEs, supra note 50, at 54. Another study of private antitrust enforcement con-
cluded that "[flew of the suits get past the procedural-issue stage, and many of these,
even when won by plaintiffs, are settled out of court." R. CASSADY & R. CASSADY, THE
PRIVATE ANTIRuST SUIT IN AMERICAN BUSINESS COMPETITION 56 (1964). Timberlake
states, "All attorneys in this field are familiar with attempts to impose heavy burdens
of discovery in the hope that the opponent will be forced to make a settlement." E.
TmBERLAXE, supra note 40, at 121. See also NADER REPORT 211.
65. Willard Mueller, a former Chief of the FrC's Bureau of Economics, claims
that "[d]ue to the financial pressures dictating quick settlements, far too many antitrust
cases are settled for much less than actual damages." Wall Street J., Jan. 18, 1972,
at 25.
66. It is speculated that Potter Instrument Corporation terminated its antitrust suit
against IBM when IBM awarded Potter a $3.5 million contract for IBM "product-de-
velopment" work. Wall Street J., Oct. 15, 1973, at 11. Eleven days later Potter an-
nounced a $2,292,940 loss for fiscal year 1973. Wall Street J., Oct. 26, 1973, at 20.
67. It is reported by sources in the computer industry that Telex' unprecedented
$259.5 million victory over IBM in the Tenth Circuit will be compromised by a pri-
vate settlement: "It is becoming more and more apparent that IBM will eventually set-
tle out of court with Telex, as the effects of that action (should it be upheld through
all appeals) would be greatly magnified through other suits." COMPUTER INDUSTRY
AssOcrAaroN, ON LINE, Jan. 1, 1974, at 4. One can understand IBM's apprehension
if it loses its appeal. Since the district court's September 1973 decision in the Telex
case, six private plaintiffs have filed separate suits charging total damages of more than
$3.9 billion.
The public interest warrants complete adjudication of the controversy provoked by
the Telex case. This resolution should be the product of the courts, not the private
offices of IBM and Telex. At issue, essentially, is what standard the courts will apply
when a dominant firm is charged with selectively adjusting its products' prices, always
remaining above their respective costs, and manipulating its sale and lease arrangementshttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss1/7
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
To summarize, it is true that the number of private suits is increas-
ing dramatically, that such suits may indeed be the wave of the
future. But closer inspection suggests that such suits may prove to
be sunshine antitrust soldiers. These suits tend to be oriented toward
corporate conduct, the odds against victory are long, and the parties
often settle out of court, all leaving concentrations of excessive market
power undisturbed. Not unlike Government suits, private antitrust ac-
tions are predominantly conceived and prosecuted in the conduct/per-
formance tradition-it is predatory behavior which is prosecuted, not
the possession of disproportionate market power responsible for that
behavior.
V. CONCLUSION
Our reading of antitrust policy indicates that almost from the begin-
ning, enforcement, whether public or private, succumbed to the siren
call of market conduct. The question of market structure was either
lost, neglected, or misplaced. Some economists contributed to the en-
forcement ambivalence by their appeal for an indulgent examination
of market performance; and when other economists emphasized the
superficiality of inquiring into market conduct they were brushed aside
as excessively doctrinaire.
Any antitrust policy oriented toward a conduct/performance strategy
is not without its consequences, however. For one thing the ques-
tion of corporate power and corporate accountability remains elusive
and unanswered. For another, any policy vacillation is bound to be
filled by government intervention, government scrutiny, and govern-
ment regulation. Administratively and politically the conduct/perform-
ance school invites an increasingly regimented economy.68 The
irony may be sweet but it is also costly.
so as to retaliate for the competitive encroachments of specific smaller competitors. The
district court found that, although IBM had not engaged in what is traditionally consid-
ered "predatory pricing" (that is, pricing below cost with the intent to damage or de-
stroy competition), "the sum total of all the evidence establishes that IBM undertook
[specific product pricing actions] with the specific and predatory intent of suppressing
and eliminating its competition and that such conduct taken pursuant to this anticom-
petitive purpose in fact suppressed and eliminated IBM's ... competition to a substan-
tial extent." Telex Corp. v. IBM, Nos. 72-C-18, 72-C-89 (N.D. Okla., Sept. -17,
1973). This particular concept of "predatory pricing" and its enforcement against
dominant firms should be reviewed by the Supreme Court. It is a public policy issue
which demands the highest adjudication, not private reconciliation.
68. See Mueler, Monopoly and the Inflation-Unemployment Dilemma: Trustbusting
or Administrative "Controls"?, 5 ANTrrgusT L. & ECON. RaV. 15 (1972).
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With the evolution of an increasingly regimented economy, the
policy dialogue concerning the direction and thrust of antitrust ob-
viously shifts to another plane. No longer does the discussion turn
on structure versus performance. Rather, the debate focuses on the
degree of fine-tuning government intervention. The results come as
no surprise: corporations become endowed with a quasi-utility status;
government assumes greater regulatory power; and the enveloping
world of Galbraith knows no bounds.
Perhaps the proposed Industrial Reorganization Act, 9 filed by Sena-
tor Philip Hart, represents our only hope for recapturing the eco-
nomic dynamism quietly suffocating in -the tightening grasp of market
concentration. The Act contemplates formation of an Industrial Reor-
ganization Commission and an Industrial Reorganization Court. The
Commission would conduct research, gather information, launch in-
vestigations, and sue for remedial market structure reformation. Re-
medies would include divestiture of corporate assets, require patent
licensing, and alter contracts and distribution methods unless unjusti-
fied by economic efficiency. The Act focuses on seven key industries,
including automobiles, chemicals, computers, and telecommunications
equipment and services. Interestingly enough, the proposal for an In-
dustrial Reorganization Court rests on the assumption that economic
matters require formation of a specialized court dealing exclusively
with these matters.
This proposed reform in antitrust policy traces its roots to the per-
sistence of industrial market concentration and the failure of public
and private suits to attack disproportionate market power-legislation
that traces its intellectual roots to the draft antitrust law proposed by
Kaysen and Turner in 195970 and by the Neal Commission in its 1969
Report.7'
69. S. 1167, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). See Hart, Restructuring the Oligopoly
Sector: The Case for a New "Industrial Reorganization" Act, 5 ANTrTRUST L. & Ecol..
REV. 35 (1972); Note, The Industrial Reorganization Act: An Antitrust Proposal
to Restructure the American Economy, 73 CoLuM. L. REv. 635 (1973).
70. C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, supra note 26, at 266.
71. WrTE HOUSE TASK FORCE REPORT ON ANTITRUST POLICY (July 5, 1968).
The bill's concern with economic concentration is reflected in its creation of a re-
buttable presumption that a corporation possesses unlawful monopoly power under three
circumstances:
(1) by any corporation if the average rate of return on net worth after
taxes is in excess of 15 per centum over a period of five consecutive years
out of the most recent seven years preceding the filing of the complaint, or
[Vol. 1974:37
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It has been some twenty-four years since Congress passed any major
antitrust legislation. The Industrial Reorganization Act is now on the
policy agenda. The Act may not be perfect in all respects, but it does
address fundamental questions we can no longer afford to ignore:
whither goes our economy? What are the consequences of persistent
market power concentration? And what is the impact of continuing to
pursue the conduct/performance policy of antitrust enforcement?
(2) if there has been no substantial price competition among two or more
corporations in any line of commerce in any section of the country for a pe-
riod of three consecutive years out of the most recent five years preceding
the filing of the complaint, or
(3) if any four or fewer corporations account for 50 per centum (or more)
of sales in any line of commerce in any section of the country in any year
out of the most recent three years preceding the filing of the complaint. ....
S. 1167, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 101(b) (1973).
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